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Abstract 
Click-fraud is the main thread of the online advertising industry. In spite of the fact that search engines constantly improve 
their traffic-filtering techniques, click-fraud remains a big problem. In this paper authors propose a new method for preventing 
advertiser’s losses and improving both his short and long terms benefits. When click-fraud is revealed advertiser saves money 
on his account (instantaneous result). However, if it remains unrevealed click-through rate increases and therefore general 
advertisement rating rises up (future result). 
The essence of the method is that the parameters of the advertising campaign are changed in dynamic and adaptive way in 
order to maximize the advertiser’s payoff function. Authors utilized game theory concepts for the advertiser’s payoff function 
construction and optimization methods for its extremum searching. 
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1. Introduction 
Game theoretical models are actively used for the Internet advertising market analysis. That is quite 
reasonable because Internet advertising system is a place where hundreds of participants with different, 
sometimes even contrary, interests interact with each other. The process of position distribution between 
advertisers is realized as an auction, which is also a subject of the game theoretical studies. 
Authors provide all-rounded researches, which usually concern system equilibrium searching [1, 2], exploring 
different auction alternations in order to maximize profits of certain participants [3, 4], defining whether it is 
gainful for some participants to take part in online fraud [5]. As opposite to these works, authors of the current 
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paper believe that game theoretical models can be also successfully used by an advertiser to withstand click-
fraud. 
Click-fraud is a special kind of online fraud when the advertisement is being clicked in order to exhaust the 
advertiser's budget in pay per click scheme. Although search engines constantly improve their fraud detection 
techniques some malicious clicks pass through protective filters because it is difficult to identify the real purpose 
of clicking. Moreover, sometimes it is not beneficial for the search engine to use filters because it loses money 
for every detected fraudulent click. That is why it will be useful for the advertiser to have independent 
mechanism of adjusting advertising campaign parameters in order to maximize his payoff function. 
Further we provide detailed investigation of the advertiser's payoff function and an example of the proposed 
adaptive technique usage within Yahoo! advertising mechanism (Yahoo! uses generalized second price auction 
[1]). At the end of the paper we also mark out conceptual difference of Google bidding scheme and outline 
possible advertiser's benefits under it. 
2. Advertiser's Payoff within Generalized Second-Price Auction 
Generalized second price auction places ads on the result page in the descending order of advertisers' bids per 
click (maximum sum of money, which an advertiser is willing to pay per one click; parameter value is set by an 
advertiser). If the user clicks on the ad-link the advertiser actually pays minimum price enough for holding 
current position. For the generalized second price auction actual price is the next advertiser's bid plus minimum 
increment. For the purpose of simplicity further we will omit increment and consider the price being equal to the 
next advertiser's bid. 
Denote by b  – bid per click; pos  – position, which was assigned to the ad (position depends on bid per click 
and competitive environment current state); α  – probability of click occurrence depending on ad's position; δ  – 
probability of ad clicking by a potential client ceteris paribus (ad usefulness from the user's viewpoint); s  – 
advertiser's one click profit; p  – actual payment per one click (next advertiser's bid). Also assume that 
competitive environment doesn't change, which means that if b  stays constant pos , p , and α  don't change 
their values as well. Then advertiser's payoff function for one ad impression (displaying on the user's screen) can 
be expressed by (1). 
( )1
AdP s pαδ= − ,  ( )bposα α=  (1) 
αδ  is the probability of legitimate clicking on the ad on a certain position. It means that for every legitimate 
impression we have αδ  valid clicks, and for every valid click – 1 αδ  impressions. Denote by ∝  probability of 
click-fraud detection by a search engine, by θ  – click-fraud rate (invalid clicks share). The share of valid clicks 
will be ( )1 θ− . If we also assume that fraudster always clicks on a displayed ad, then advertiser's payoff function 
for one impression in view of fraud presence will be expressed by (2). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 0 1 1
AdP s p p s p pθ αδ ∝ θ θ αδ ∝ θ= − − + − ∗ ∗ − = − − − −  (2) 
Let's estimate the number of impressions per day. Since daily budget B  (set by the advertiser) is bounded, the 
number of clicks per day is m B p= , with ( )1m B pθ= −  valid and m B pθ=  invalid clicks. Every invalid 
click corresponds to one impression, so the number of invalid impressions is 1*n m B pθ= =  . The number of 
valid impressions is calculated by a formula ( )1 * 1n m B pαδ θ αδ= = − . Total number of impressions per day: 
[ ] ( )( )1n n n B p θ αδ θ= + = − + .   
Advertiser's daily profit will be computed by (3). 
[ ] ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1AddayP B p s p pθ αδ θ θ αδ ∝ θ= − + − − − −  (3) 
The ad can be demonstrated on several platforms with different click-fraud rates. Denote by l  number of 
platforms, by iγ  – fraction of impressions falling on i -th platform ( 1 2 1lγ γ γ+ + + = ), and by iθ , ia , ip  – the 
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i -th platform characteristics (click-fraud rate, clicking probability on position, next advertiser's bid). Thereby 
daily payoff will be expressed by (4). 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 1
l lAd
day i i i i i i i i i i ii i
P B p s p pγ γ θ α δ θ θ α δ ∝ θ
= =
⎡ ⎤= − + − − − −⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  (4) 
If we denote by iψ  competitive environment characteristics on the i -th platform ( iψ  is a vector of 
competitors' bids in descending order), then all parameters of function (4) can be divided in four groups: 
parameters set by advertiser ( B , iγ , b ), environmental parameters ( iθ , ∝ , iψ ), advertiser constants ( l , δ , s ), 
and depending parameters ( ip  and iα  depend on b  and iψ ). 
Let's analyze how payoff function (3) depends on click-fraud rate θ . Performing some elementary 




dayP ξθ ξ θ ξ= − + ,  (5) 
with factor values [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1B p s p pξ αδ αδ αδ ∝= − − + − , [ ] ( )( ) ( )( )2 2 1B p s p pξ αδ αδ αδ ∝= − − + − , 
and [ ]( )3 B p s pξ = − . 
Since α , δ , and ∝  are probabilities, that is 0 , , 1α δ ∝≤ ≤ , and 0s p− ≥  (advertiser must get positive 
revenue from clicking) 
1 0ξ ≥ . Thus (5) is a parabola with upward branches. In order to find function's zeros we 
will rewrite it as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )





s pBP s p p
p s p p
αδαδ αδ ∝ θ θ
αδ αδ αδ ∝
⎡ ⎤−⎡ ⎤
= − − + − − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (6) 
From (6) we get ( )1 1 1θ αδ= − , ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1s p s p pθ αδ αδ ∝= − − + − . 1 1θ ≥  because 0 , 1α δ≤ ≤ as 
probabilities. [ ]2 0;1θ ∈  since it is a ratio of positive number to a greater positive number ( 0 1∝≤ ≤ ). 
Branches of parabola (5) are upward and it has two roots 1 1θ ≥  and 20 1θ≤ ≤ , that is why on the interval 
( ) ( )0 0 1P θ≥ × ≤ ≤  (non-negative payoff and valid values for probability parameter) advertiser's payoff 
monotonically decreases with increasing fraud rate. That means click-fraud causes only losses for the advertiser 
within general second-price auction model. 
Consider a couple of practical examples. Assume we want to maximize payoff function (6) with advertiser 
constants 2l = , 1δ = , 0.53s = , environmental parameters 1 2 0θ θ= = , 0∝ =  and 1 2=ψ ψ . Assume that 
search engine provide 10 advertising positions on the result page, so there are 9 competitors on each platform 
( ( )1 2dim , 1 9= ×ψ ψ ). Suppose ( )1 2 0.55 0.53 0.46 0.45 0.4 0.39 0.35 0.3 0.2= =ψ ψ . Advertiser's position on 
the i -th platform is defined by (7). 
( )( )arg maxi j ipos b j= >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ψ    (7) 
Assume that α  on ipos  is a tabulated function presented in Table 1 (actual values were taken from [6] as for 
10-position result page in AdWords auction). The advertiser wants to know which values of parameters B , iγ , 
b  will provide maximum of the payoff function (6). Since it has tabulated part we need to carry out numerical 
optimization. For example, the advertiser has the following restrictions on optimizable parameters: 0 100B≤ ≤  
(daily budget bounds), 1 2 1γ γ+ = , 0iγ ≥ , 0 b s≤ ≤  (pay per click can't exceed one-click profit). 
Providing numerical optimization of (6) with fmincon function in MATLAB framework and described above 
parameter values we got 100B = , 1 2 0.5γ γ= = , 0.53b =  with profit 15.22P = . The advertiser gets third 
position on both platforms. Because every impression results in positive revenue daily budget is set to its 
maximum value. 
If competitive environment on the 2d platform will change to ( )2 0.54 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.4 0.39 0.35 0.3 0.2=ψ  
we will get new optimal values 100B = , 1 0γ = , 2 1γ = , 0.53b =  providing profit 17.78P = . Competitive 
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situation on the 2d platform have changed so, that one click on it brings more money than a click on the 1st 
platform. That is why it is more beneficial to concentrate all budget resources on the 2d platform. 











1 0.2593 3 0.1232 5 0.0902 7 0.0622 9 0.0397 
2 0.1551 4 0.1011 6 0.0812 8 0.0519 10 0.0360 
 
Now let's assume that click-fraud rate on the 2d platform rises up to 2 0.002θ = . Optimal parameters values 
will remain the same as in previous example, but total revenue will fall down to 16.42P = . Further increase in 
click-through rate to 2 0.1θ =  changes optimal share of impressions to 1 1γ = , 2 0γ = , advertiser's revenue to 
15.22P = . If click-fraud rate on the 1st platform also rises up to 1 0.1θ =  optimization process gives 0B = . It 
means that fraud losses exceed valid clicks profit on both platforms and it is more beneficial for the advertiser to 
stop (or pause) his campaign. However if search engine filters 80% of fraudulent clicks advertising becomes 
profitable with optimal parameters values 100B = , 1 0γ = , 2 1γ = , 0.53b =  and profit 2.54P = . 
3. Conclusions 
In current paper authors constructed the advertiser's payoff function for the generalized second-price auction 
and showed that it can be successfully used by an advertiser to dynamically identify most profitable 
environmental changes responses. 
Payoff function analysis revealed that click-fraud results in advertisers' losses under generalized second-price 
auction scheme, however it can be beneficial under Google auction. The latter differs in bidding mechanism: it 
sorts ads in the descending order of their ranks, which is a product of per click bid and quality score. Quality 
score depends on click-through rate (CTR) which is calculated by a formula 
[ ] ( )( ) ( )1 1CTR m n B p B p θ αδ θ αδ θ θαδ⎡ ⎤= = − + = − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ . 
CTR rises up while θ  increases. Despite the fact that in base model (3) click-fraud caused benefits most 
probably will be less than click-fraud losses, fraudulent activity can be beneficial in future. For example, in 
strongly competitive environment it can be difficult to get the first position by bid changing. However first 
position makes company a leader in certain area, which can be beneficial even outside Internet-advertising. 
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